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Abstract 
Research is needed on the affective mechanisms that motivate people to ruminate. One possibility is that some 
people might ruminate in response to deficits in emotional clarity because not knowing how they feel might be 
intolerable to them. We tested the hypothesis that the relationship between low emotional clarity and rumination 
would be moderated by intolerance of ambiguity. Participants in a longitudinal online study (N = 195) provided self-
reports of intolerance of ambiguity and rumination and reported state emotional clarity following an idiographic 
mood induction; three weeks later they reported on rumination again. As predicted, participants with low emotional 
clarity at Time 1 ruminated more three weeks later, but only if they were intolerant of ambiguity. Findings support 
the notion that rumination sometimes functions as a search for answers about emotions. We discuss implications 
for understanding the affective disturbances perpetuating vicious cycles of rumination and for rumination-focused 
clinical interventions. 
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Introduction 
“People, not constructs.” This phrase became familiar to all of Susan’s students. She would write it in the margins 
of our drafts and repeat it when we discussed each other’s manuscripts in lab meetings. Now, in Susan’s absence, 
we often return to this phrase. On the surface, Susan meant that we should improve our writing by using dynamic, 
people-centered language and clinical examples, instead of psychological jargon; indeed, her own writing was 
always lucid and unpretentious. But this phrase is about more than writing. It reminds us that what ultimately 
matters in this profession is not -isms, not models with boxes and arrows, but human experience—often human 
suffering. We believe that what drove Susan to conduct her research on rumination, and part of what made her 
research so influential, was her abiding curiosity about what it is like to be human. ‘People, not constructs’ also 
encapsulates how it felt to interact with Susan. It did not matter that she was a legendary scholar or the Chair of the 
department; she never put on airs. She had a particular way of regarding everyone she spoke to: steadily, 
seriously, and with a kind of quiet intensity that communicated her eagerness to listen. We pay tribute to Susan and 
her fundamental interest in others by attempting to exemplify ‘people, not constructs’ in our presentation of the 
current study. 
In her seminal work on rumination, Susan Nolen-Hoeksema (1991) conceptualized this process as a maladaptive 
style of thinking in which people perseverate on the causes, consequences, and meanings of their negative affect. 
Since then, extensive research has shown that rumination exacerbates sad mood, impairs problem solving, 
reduces instrumental behavior, and drives away social support (see Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 
2008). Moreover, rumination has been associated with the development and maintenance of a wide range of 
mental disorders, such as depression, anxiety, eating disorders, and substance abuse problems (see Aldao, Nolen-
Hoeksema, & Schweizer, 2010). One of the problematic features of rumination is that it is self-perpetuating: it is 
relatively easy to fall into a ruminative cycle, and it is also quite difficult to stop once it has begun (e.g., Gotlib & 
Joormann, 2010; Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008; Smith & Alloy, 2009; 
Watkins, 2008). Given these difficulties interrupting rumination, it is critical that we develop a more nuanced 
understanding of the mechanisms that initiate the ruminative cycle in the first place. Identifying such “upstream” 
mechanisms will show us how to bypass rumination cycles before they even start and consequently, could inform 
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prevention programs and psychosocial interventions (Watkins et al., 2011). In this investigation, we shed light on 
affective mechanisms that might drive people to ruminate in the first place. Specifically, we examined the possibility 
that some people ruminate as a response to the discomfort of not understanding which emotions they feel. 
Several lines of research suggest that one important reason why people ruminate is to search for answers to 
personally salient questions. Ruminators tend to believe that ruminating will help them gain insight into themselves 
and their problems (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001, 2002; Watkins & Baracaia, 2001; see also co-rumination, Rose, 
Carlson, & Waller, 2007). One study has also found that participants rated themselves as more insightful 
individuals after being randomly assigned to ruminate versus distract themselves with neutral thoughts 
(Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993), which suggests that the experience of ruminating might feel like a 
process of finding insight. Rumination may be a strategy for making sense of uncertainty about the future (de Jong-
Meyer, Beck, & Riede, 2009; Liao & Wei, 2011; Yook, Kim, Suh, & Lee, 2010), and for understanding and resolving 
discrepancies between current and ideal states when pursuing goals (Martin & Tesser, 1996; Moberly & Watkins, 
2010; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987; Watkins, 2008). 
We propose to examine the use of rumination in relation to the task of making sense of a specific uncertain state 
that is particularly relevant for the work on emotion regulation: low emotional clarity. Emotional clarity has been 
conceptualized as the subjective experience of having difficulty identifying which emotions one feels (e.g., Gohm & 
Clore, 2002; Salovey, Mayer, Goldman, Turvey, & Palfai, 1995). Deficits in emotional clarity have been associated 
with symptoms of mental disorders (e.g., Boden, Gross, Babson, & Bonn-Miller, 2013; Flynn & Rudolph, 2010; 
Mennin, Holaway, Fresco, Moore, & Heimberg, 2007; Spokas, Luterek, & Heimberg, 2009), leading emotional 
clarity to be conceptualized as a transdiagnostic process that accounts for dysfunction across psychopathology 
(Vine & Aldao, 2014). Importantly, the ability to be clear about one’s emotions is increasingly being considered a 
precursor to the regulation of emotions (e.g., Barrett, Gross, Christensen, & Benvenuto, 2001; Boden, Bonn-Miller, 
Kashdan, Alvarez, & Gross, 2012; Flynn & Rudolph, 2010; Kashdan, Ferssizidis, Collins, & Muraven, 2010), which 
renders it an ideal candidate for the examination of upstream processes preceding rumination. 
A few studies have linked low emotional clarity with constructs that are functionally similar to rumination. For 
instance, a structural equation model in a sample of children associated low self-reported emotional clarity with a 
latent variable constructed in part from a measure of involuntary engagement coping that included rumination items 
(Flynn & Rudolph, 2010). In another study, the association between emotional clarity and depression was mediated 
by self-reported difficulty disengaging attention from goal-irrelevant stimuli (Vine & Aldao, 2014), an emotion 
regulatory deficit reminiscent the cognitive impairment associated with rumination (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010). 
Finally, participants reporting deficits in emotional clarity at the trait level responded with more negative, 
uncontrollable, and insistent thoughts following a negative mood induction, suggestive of a higher ruminative 
response (Salovey et al., 1995). To our knowledge, only one existing study has gone a step further to characterize 
the nature of the relationship between emotional clarity and rumination. As part of a larger meta-mood model of 
depression, Salguero, Extremera, and Fernández-Berrocal (2013) demonstrated an indirect statistical path from 
low emotional clarity to rumination through self-reported difficulties repairing negative mood, which they interpreted 
as evidence that people with low emotional clarity might turn to rumination in essence as a default, because of their 
inability to repair mood in any other way. Yet, it remains possible that people with low emotional clarity turn to 
rumination not only for lack of another emotion regulation strategy, but because they seek a specific remedy to the 
problem of not fully understanding how they feel. 
If indeed rumination functions as a search for emotional clarity, then this process would most likely play out only 
among those individuals troubled by not having emotional clarity. Simply put, people search for things when they 
are bothered by not having them; only the individual bothered by mismatching socks goes in search of a lost one. 
People vary in their ability to feel comfortable with stimuli they do not understand or that are subject to multiple 
interpretations, a trait known as intolerance of ambiguity (Budner, 1962; McLain, 1993). Unlike the intolerance of 
uncertainty construct, which concerns distress about unknown future events, intolerance of ambiguity refers 
uncertainty in present-moment situations (Grenier, Barrette, & Ladouceur, 2005), which could apply to states of low 
emotional clarity. Fundamentally, our account of rumination as a search for emotional clarity presupposes that the 
relationship between low emotional clarity and rumination is moderated by intolerance of ambiguity, such that 
individuals bothered by ambiguity would be more motivated to ruminate in response to not knowing how they feel. 
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In the current investigation, we tested this moderation hypothesis using a longitudinal online sample. To improve 
upon the validity made possible by trait-based measures of emotional phenomena (Robinson & Clore, 2002), we 
assessed emotional clarity in a state-based manner in the context of negative moods related to personally relevant, 
upsetting events. In order to shed light on the temporal aspect of the relationship between emotional clarity and 
rumination, we assessed rumination at two time points. Participants provided self-reports of intolerance of 
ambiguity and rumination and reported state emotional clarity following an idiographic mood induction. Then, three 
weeks later, they reported on rumination again. We predicted that participants with low emotional clarity at Time 1 
would ruminate significantly more three weeks later if they were intolerant of ambiguity. 
Method 
Recruitment 
The present investigation utilizes data from the first and third assessments of a larger study conducted across three 
time points, since this longer interval would help to more adequately evaluate changes in rumination over time. We 
recruited participants using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (mTurk.com), an internet-based crowdsourcing platform. On 
mTurk, individuals (“workers”) select tasks they wish to complete for pay, such as psychological surveys, from 
among thousands of tasks posted by other users (“requesters”). MTurk workers have been shown to be highly 
motivated to complete tasks regardless of levels of pay (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011), and tend to provide 
reliable behavioral data comparable to that obtained in laboratory participants (Crump, McDonnell, & Gureckis, 
2013; Goodman, Cryder, & Cheema, 2012; Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010). Importantly, recent 
investigations suggests that mTurk is suited to clinical research, as typical mTurk samples report levels of 
depression, anxiety, trauma exposure, and substance use difficulties that meet or exceed national rates (e.g., 
Aldao & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2012; Shapiro, Chandler, & Mueller, 2013). 
We limited the study to participants aged 18 and older, residing in the United States, and holding an approval rating 
of 95% or higher on prior mTurk tasks. Participants responding to the listing for a questionnaire-based study 
entitled, “The Personality, Emotion, and Imagination Study,” were directed to an external website (Qualtrics.com) to 
complete the initial assessment, which was designed to take approximately 45-50 minutes. We followed 
recommendations by other researchers and used stringent criteria to determine eligibility for compensation (e.g., 
Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009; Pennycook, Cheyne, Seli, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2011; Prince, 
Litovsky, & Friedman-Wheeler, 2012). We paid participants $3 if they reported a unique mTurk worker ID and 
showed a unique computer IP Address, spent at least half the expected time completing the study, and passed a 
sufficient number of “attention check” questions. Attention check items were embedded within questionnaires and 
instructed participants to leave that item blank to show they were reading carefully. 
Upon completing the first assessment, participants were given the opportunity to provide their email address in 
order to be re-contacted for two follow-up assessments, designed to take 35-40 and 25-30 minutes, respectively, 
and scheduled approximately 10-12 days apart. Participants received $2 for each follow-up assessment and an 
additional $2 bonus if they completed all 3 assessments. Participants opting to complete follow-ups received an 
email 8 days later reminding them that an assessment was coming soon. After 1-3 more days, they were notified 
that the assessment was currently posted and available for 5 days. Participants received targeted reminder emails 
as needed when they had 3, 2, and 1 days remaining to complete the follow-up. To give priority to complete sets of 
data, we did not invite for a third assessment those participants who missed the second assessment. Participants 
were fully debriefed upon declining follow-up assessments or completing the third assessment. 
Participants 
Of the 387 participants who completed the Time 1 assessment, 24 were removed from the dataset because they 
missed 3 or more of the 13 “attention check” items embedded within the measures. We removed data from 5 
additional participants who completed the survey in less than 25 minutes, leaving a total of 359 participants at Time 
1. Of the 281 participants who completed the Time 2 assessment, 4 were removed for missing 3 or more of the 10 
attention check items, and 22 were removed for taking less than 20 minutes. Further, 11 were removed for 
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completing the Time 2 assessment twice (we retained the first administration, unless it was clear that participants 
had barely begun the first time and returned to complete it in full). This left a total sample of 244 for the Time 2 
assessment. Of the 214 participants who completed the Time 3 assessment, 2 were removed for missing 2 or more 
of the 8 attention check items, 6 for taking less than 15 minutes, and 7 for completing the assessment a second 
time, leaving a total of 199 participants at Time 3. Retention rates (72.61% at Time 2; 76.10% at Time 3) were 
within the 60-80% range over comparable timeframes in previous mTurk studies (Buhrmester et al., 2011; Shapiro 
et al., 2013). 
For the present study, we used data from the 195 participants (66.7% female) who completed all measures of 
interest. The mean age of the sample was 34.8 (SD = 11.4, range 18-66). In terms of the ethnic breakdown, 80.5% 
identified as Caucasian, 8.7% as African American, 6.2% as Hispanic or Latino, 7.2% as Asian or Asian-American, 
2.1% as Native American, and 1.5% as “other.”  Fifty two percent of participants reported they had not completed 
college. The mean interval between the assessments used in the present investigation was 22.58 days (SD = 
2.76). 
Retained vs. attritted subjects. 
We examined demographic data for differences between the final sample of 195 and the participants who did not 
complete all three assessments. Compared to participants who were not retained, participants in the final sample 
were marginally more likely to be female, 66.7% vs. 57.3%, χ2 = 3.32, p < .07, and to identify as Caucasian, 80.5% 
vs. 73.2%, χ2 = 2.73, p < .10. The final sample was significantly older than participants who were not retained (Ms 
34.8 vs. 29.1 years), F(1,357) = 26.36, p < .001, so we initially included age as a covariate in main analyses. 
However, this did not affect significant findings, so we removed age for the sake of parsimony.1 
Mood Induction 
Participants underwent a brief, idiographic mood induction in which they were asked first to select and then to 
immerse themselves in an upsetting memory. The memory selection phase provided the following instructions: 
“Think of an event in your life when someone close to you made you extremely upset. If you can think of more than 
one upsetting conflict, event, or experience, pick the event that still makes you the most upset and continues to feel 
the most unresolved.”  These instructions deliberately did not indicate a specific target emotion, so as not to 
provide participants the ‘answer’ about how they were feeling and to leave more room for variabilty in emotional 
clarity. To understand the content of participants’ memories, we immediately asked participants to type a 180-
character description of the experience they had selected and report when it had happened and how resolved it 
currently felt. The first question was phrased, “How long ago did it happen? If it is an ongoing or repeating event, 
answer based on the last time it happened.”  Participants replied using a 5-point ordinal scale (1 = two years ago or 
more; 2 = one year ago; 3 = in the last year; 4 = in the last month; 5 = in the last week). The second question read, 
“How resolved does the conflict feel” and directed participants to respond on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = not at all; 2 
= a little; 3 = somewhat; 4 = moderately; 5 = mostly or completely). 
We adapted the immersion phase of the mood induction from a previously validated procedure (Kross, Ayduk, & 
Mischel, 2005). In order to increase the interactive nature of the induction, and to ensure that participants did not 
become distracted or leave their computers during this portion of the procedure, we asked participants to write 
about their memory as they re-experienced it. Instructions for this phase read: 
For the next few minutes, try to re-experience the event as vividly as you can. Picture the event happening to 
you all over again. Picture in your “mind’s eye” the surroundings as clearly as possible. See the people or 
objects; hear the sounds; experience the events happening to you. Think the thoughts that this event makes 
you think. Feel the same feelings that this event makes you feel. Let yourself react as if you were actually in the 
middle of it right now. 
                                                     
 
1 The pattern of significant findings was also unaffected by covarying gender and ethnicity. 
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While you re-experience the event, write about what is happening in the situation, how the other person or 
people involved behaved toward you, and what you are thinking. The screen will advance on its own when the 
time is up. Begin writing now. 
Participants were given 130 seconds to read these instructions and write about their memory. We selected this 
relatively short time frame in order to prevent participants from experiencing therapeutic effects of self-disclosing 
(Pennebaker, 1997) or growing bored. Immediately following the immersion participants reported how vividly they 
had re-imagined or remembered the experience and how upset they felt in that exact moment on a 5-point Likert 
scale (1 = not at all; 2 = a little; 3 = somewhat; 4 = moderately; 5 = very much). 
Measures 
Emotional clarity. 
Participants reported how clearly they understood their emotions about the upsetting memory using the state 
version of the Clarity subscale of the Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS; Gratz & Roemer, 2004; see 
McLaughlin, Mennin, & Farach, 2007). Participants rate their agreement with 5 statements on a 5-point Likert scale 
(e.g., ‘I am confused about how I am feeling’). We keyed items so that higher numbers represent higher emotional 
clarity. Internal consistency in our sample was good, α = .90. 
Rumination. 
We assessed rumination using the 5-item Brooding subscale of the Ruminative Response Styles scale (Treynor, 
Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003), which assess the extent to which people engage in repetitive thought 
processes when feeling sad, blue, or depressed. We utilized the Brooding subscale, which has been shown to be 
independent of symptoms of depression (e.g., Treynor et al., 2003). Reliability in our sample was acceptable, α = 
.76 at Time 1 and α = .86 at Time 3. 
Intolerance of ambiguity. 
We assessed intolerance of ambiguity using the Multiple Stimulus Types Ambiguity Tolerance test (MSTAT-I; 
McLain, 1993), a 22-item measure of positive and negative affective responses to situations that are unfamiliar, 
complex, uncertain, or subject to multiple interpretations (e.g., ‘I dislike ambiguous situations,’ ‘I’m drawn to 
situations which can be interpreted in more than one way’). Participants rate their agreement with each item on a 7-
point Likert scale. We keyed items so that higher scores reflect intolerance of ambiguity. Reliability in our sample 
was good, α = .88. 
Procedure 
At Time 1, participants completed a trait battery containing the measures of rumination and intolerance of 
ambiguity. Following the trait measures, they completed the mood induction procedure and reported their emotional 
clarity. At Time 3, participants completed a similar battery of trait questionnaires that contained the same measure 
of rumination. 
Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
Manipulation check. 
All participants in the final sample had completed the 180-character descriptions of their memories. Informal review 
of these responses confirmed that they had selected upsetting interpersonal memories as instructed. Common 
themes included loss (e.g., “Our son died unexpectedly”), betrayal (e.g., “My ex-husband took our son away from 
me and lied to gain temporary custody”), interpersonal conflict (e.g., “I am an atheist and when I told my father he 
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became very upset”), financial conflict (e.g., “Having my mother default on a loan agreement”), and social rejection 
(e.g., “My colleagues gossip about me behind my back”). One hundred and fourteen participants (58.5%) selected 
memories of experiences they said had occurred 2 years ago or more. Participants reported that these experiences 
still felt unresolved, M = 2.55, SD = 1.43, mode (33.3% of participants) = 1 (Not at all resolved). On average, 
participants reported re-imagining the experience moderately to very vividly, M = 4.24, SD = .85, mode (46.7% of 
participants) = 5 (very vividly). They also reported feeling upset, M = 3.20, SD = 1.32, mode (26.2% of participants) 
= 4 (moderately upset). 
Descriptive analyses and bivariate correlations. 
Means, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations of study variables appear in Table 1. Variables were 
largely uncorrelated, but emotional clarity was significantly associated with rumination at both time points (ps < 
.001). 
Table 1: Sample Characteristics and Bivariate Correlations for Variables at Relevant Time Points 
 M (SD) or Frequency 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
1. Age 34.82 (11.44) -       
2. Caucasian  157 (80.5%) .10 -      
3. Female 130 (66.7%) .13 .06 -     
4. Emotional Clarity 4.29 (.85) .07 .04 .10 -    
5. Intolerance of Ambiguity 85.10 (18.96) .05 .01 −.01 −.10 -   
6. Time 1 Rumination 11.28 (3.34) −.14† −.06 .12 −.30*** .11 -  
7. Time 3 Rumination 10.61 (3.88) −.13† −.09 .10 −.31*** .10 .79*** - 
Note. †p < .10. ***p < .001. 
Main Analyses 
To examine the hypothesis that intolerance of ambiguity would moderate the relationship between emotional clarity 
and rumination over time, we constructed a hierarchical linear regression model predicting rumination scores at 
Time 3. We used untransformed scores on trait measures because sample distributions were sufficiently normal, as 
indicated by skewness statistics below 2 (Tabachnik & Fidell, 2007). To improve the interpretability of results, we 
centered the predictor variables. In the first step, we entered Time 1 rumination as a covariate, which explained the 
majority of the variance in Time 3 rumination (adjusted R2 = 62.0%), F(1,193) = 317.39, p < .001. In the second 
step, we entered emotional clarity and intolerance of ambiguity scores, which did not account for any added 
variance in Time 3 rumination scores, R2∆ = 0.01, F(2,191) = 1.80, p > .16. However, adding the emotional clarity-
by-intolerance of ambiguity interaction term in the final step of the model accounted for a significant increase in 
variance in Time 3 rumination scores, R2∆ = 0.01, F(1,190) = 4.90, p < .03. As shown in Table 2, the main effect of 
emotional clarity, which was marginally significant, b = -.36, SE = .21, t = -1.73, p < .10, was qualified by an 
interaction with intolerance of ambiguity, b = -.02, SE = .01, t = -2.21, p < .03. 
We probed the interaction using the PROCESS macro by Hayes (2013) and found a pattern consistent with our 
hypothesis. The conditional effect of emotional clarity on Time 3 rumination was not significant at the 10th, 25th, and 
50th percentile values of intolerance of ambiguity, but was significant at the 75th and 90th percentile values. In other 
words, among participants very low, low, and moderate in intolerance of ambiguity, emotional clarity did not predict 
change in rumination over time. In contrast, among participants high and very high in intolerance of ambiguity, low 
emotional clarity following the mood induction predicted increased rumination at Time 3 (see Table 2 and Figure 1). 
Following Hayes (2013) we further probed the interaction using the Johnson-Neyman technique to estimate the 
specific value of intolerance of ambiguity at which the conditional effect of emotional clarity becomes significant. 
This value was 87.38, which falls slightly above the sample mean of 85.10 and median of 85.00 and well within the 
observed range of 41-139. In other words, for participants in approximately the top half of the distribution of 
intolerance of ambiguity scores, experiencing low emotional clarity in the context of upsetting memories was a 
liability for later rumination. 
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Table 2: Predictors of Time 3 Rumination 
Predictor R2∆ F b SE t p 
Hierarchical regression model 
Step 1 .622 317.39    .000 
 T1 Rumination   .92 .05 17.82 .000 
Step 2 .007 1.80    .167 
 T1 Rumination   .88 .05 16.44 .000 
 Emotional Clarity   −.40 .21 −1.87 .063 
 Intolerance of Ambiguity   .00 .01 .20 .841 
Step 3 .009 4.90    .028 
 T1 Rumination   .88 .05 16.55 .000 
 Emotional Clarity   -.36 .21 −1.73 .092 
 Intolerance of Ambiguity   .00 .01 .26 .799 
 Emotional Clarity x 
   Intolerance of Ambiguity 
  -.02 .01 −2.21 .028 
Conditional effect of emotional clarity at values of intolerance of ambiguity 
10th Percentile (59.00)   .20 .34 .59 .556 
25th Percentile (74.00)   −.12 .24 −.51 .611 
50th Percentile (85.00)   −.36 .21 −1.72 .086 
75th Percentile (96.00)   −.60 .23 −2.62 .009 
90th Percentile (109.00)   −.88 .30 −2.91 .004 
Note. Parenthetical values in lower portion of table represent corresponding raw values on the Multiple Stimulus Types 
Ambiguity Tolerance test (MSTAT-I). 
 
 
Figure 1: Moderation of the relationship between emotional clarity and Time 3 rumination by intolerance of 
ambiguity, controlling for Time 1 rumination. IA = intolerance of ambiguity. Relationships are estimated at a raw 
value of 2.8 for low emotional clarity and 5.0 for high emotional clarity and at 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentile 
values of intolerance of ambiguity. 
10
10.5
11
11.5
12
Low Emotional Clarity High Emotional Clarity
Ti
m
e 
3 
R
um
in
at
io
n 
Very Low IA
Low IA
Moderate IA
High IA
Very High IA
 Journal of Experimental Psychopathology, Volume 5 (2014), Issue 3, 229-243 237 
Discussion 
Rumination is difficult to interrupt once it has begun (e.g., Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993), so it is essential 
to understand the mechanisms that might lure people into ruminating in the first place. The present study extends 
the literature on the reasons why people ruminate by providing preliminary support for the hypothesis that some 
people ruminate in response to low emotional clarity. As we predicted, the relationship between emotional clarity 
and changes in rumination three weeks later was moderated by initial intolerance of ambiguity. Participants with 
low emotional clarity ruminated more three weeks later, but only if they were the kind of people who experienced 
not knowing as aversive. These findings have implications for enhancing our understanding of basic mechanisms 
underlying rumination, emotion dysregulation, and psychopathology, and for optimizing clinical interventions. 
Our findings are broadly consistent with previous studies suggesting that people might ruminate in order to search 
for answers to personally salient questions (Martin & Tesser, 1996; Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001, 2002; Watkins & 
Baracaia, 2001). They also extend this literature by suggesting a novel, emotion-specific variant of this idea: that 
rumination might function as a search for answers specifically about which emotions people are feeling. The link 
between rumination and low emotional clarity has been observed before (Flynn & Rudolph, 2010; Salguero et al., 
2013), but to our knowledge we are the first to ‘zoom in’ with the goal of explaining why low emotional clarity might 
predict rumination in particular. In the meta-mood model of depression by Salguero et al. (2013), low emotional 
clarity predicted rumination by way of low self-reported ability to repair emotions, suggesting that depressed 
individuals might default to ruminating because they believe they are unable to regulate their emotions effectively. 
Although we cannot assume causality based on our methods, our study raises an alternative possibility that for 
some individuals, rumination is rather a motivated search for answers fueled by dislike of ambiguity. 
A relatively distinct ‘why ruminate’ literature suggests that people might ruminate to suppress or avoid unwanted 
internal experiences (i.e., experiential suppression; Giorgio et al., 2010; Liverant, Kamholz, Sloan, & Brown, 2011). 
Our findings can be interpreted in light of this literature as well because they suggest that low emotional clarity 
might be one such type of aversive internal experience that individuals wish to avoid. Although we did not measure 
distress per se, intolerance of ambiguity by definition involves a distress or discomfort in the face of unclear stimuli 
(McLain, 1993). Thus, the significant moderation by intolerance of ambiguity implies that low emotional clarity might 
predict rumination because not knowing how one feels might be distressing for some people. In order to provide a 
stronger test of our theory, and to explore links to experiential suppression, it will be fruitful to develop ways of 
assessing the distress associated with unclear emotional states more directly. It will also be important to use 
experimental paradigms to assess the functional relationship between emotional clarity and rumination in a number 
of contexts (Aldao, 2013). 
It is interesting to consider whether the relationship between emotional clarity and intolerance of ambiguity we 
found would generalize to forms of repetitive thought other than rumination. Reflective pondering may also arise in 
the presence of negative mood, but might ultimately facilitate effective problem solving and reduce depression 
symptoms over time (Martin & Tesser, 1996; Treynor et al., 2003). Given its more adaptive nature, it is possible 
that reflective pondering occurs under more favorable conditions, such as when tolerance for ambiguity is higher or 
emotions are clearer. Alternatively, the presence of another moderating variable might be required to explain why 
some individuals ponder reflectively instead of ruminating. Worry also resembles rumination, but whereas 
ruminators typically seek answers about their negative affect and past or current problems, worriers seek answers 
about uncertain future events (Freeston, Rhéaume, Letarte, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1994; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 
2008). Worry has been associated with low emotional clarity (Salters-Pedneault, Roemer, Tull, Rucker, & Mennin, 
2006) and characterized as a means of suppressing the distress associated with intense, poorly understood 
emotions (Mennin & Fresco, 2009). This portrayal of worry would suggest that worry might also serve as a 
response to low emotional clarity. However, the phenomenological differences in worry content suggest it might not 
necessarily function as a search for answers about emotions per se. 
The present research has implications for both affective and clinical science. It is the premise of many psychosocial 
interventions that problems understanding emotions may lead to difficulties regulating them adaptively (e.g., 
Linehan, 1993; Mennin & Fresco, 2009). Our study contributes a novel account of how this process may work in 
some cases. The relationship between understanding and regulating emotions is typically explained in terms of an 
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affect as information framework: emotions provide information about the situation (Schwarz & Clore, 1983), so 
confusion about emotions interferes with decision-making about how to regulate them (Barrett et al., 2001; 
Baumeister, Vohs, DeWall, & Zhang, 2007). The present account of rumination goes beyond the mere lack of 
information about what one feels, and underscores the experience of that lack of information, which may provoke 
rumination because it feels intolerable to some people. This mechanism, if it is supported by future research, could 
be relevant to a number of mental disorders. We recently identified low emotional clarity as a transdiagnostic risk 
factor for at least five forms of psychopathology that likely operates through mechanisms involving problems in 
emotion regulation (Vine & Aldao, 2014). Rumination also occurs transdiagnostically (McLaughlin & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2011). Thus, our model of rumination as a response to low emotional clarity could help explain 
mechanisms underlying multiple forms of psychopathology. 
Limitations and Strengths 
Online sampling methods have a few potential limitations. First, unselected recruitment may have limited the 
generalizability of our results. Participants were predominantly Caucasian and were not selected for clinical 
symptoms, despite the clinical relevance of our research question. It is promising, though, that participants were 
diverse in terms of education attainment (more than half reporting they had not finished college), and that rates of 
clinical symptoms in mTurk samples meet or exceed national levels (Shapiro et al., 2013). Second, it was difficult to 
retain participants across repeated assessments using mTurk, which could have skewed the characteristics of 
completers in ways that confounded results. However, retention rates across both waves of data collection 
(72.61%, 76.10%) compare favorably to the 60-80% range reported in prior studies (Buhrmester et al., 2011; 
Shapiro et al., 2013). Moreover, we found few differences between retained vs. attritted subjects (retained subjects 
were older), and when we accounted for possible attrition-related confounds in analyses, there was no effect on 
significant findings. A third potential problem for studies conducted on mTurk is poor data quality due to inattention 
or low effort by participants (Paolacci et al., 2010). Nevertheless, the quality of data used in the present study can 
be considered quite high, due to our stringent inclusion criteria, such as our use of “attention check” items. All 
participants in the final sample had provided a written description of their upsetting memory, suggesting they had 
completed the study faithfully. 
Ultimately, our hypothesis that low emotional clarity predicts rumination is a causal hypothesis about state-level 
processes we imagine unfolding in the moments leading to the onset of a rumination episode. But while our 
hypothesis is causal, it is important to note that our study design does not allow causal inferences about state-level 
phenomena. We used trait-level, self reported scores of rumination, and we did not manipulate emotional clarity, 
which would be required in order to conclude that deficits in clarity might actually trigger rumination. Nevertheless, 
our use of a longitudinal sample can be considered a strength because it allowed us to establish a temporal 
relationship, with low emotional clarity predicting subsequent change in levels of rumination. The relatively short 
interval between assessments (approximately 22 days) presents a trade-off. Since we used a trait measure of 
rumination, scores were fairly stable over time, which reduced our ability to predict changes in them. Perhaps had 
our data spanned a larger time interval, we would have found larger effects of emotional clarity and stronger 
moderation by intolerance of uncertainty. On the other hand, the shorter interval makes it likelier that participants 
were still bothered on a regular basis by the topics they selected for the mood induction at Time 1, and that the 
changes in rumination we captured had to do with the emotional clarity they experienced when thinking about these 
topics. 
The most notable strengths of our study are related to the mood induction, which reflects our commitment to 
making discoveries relevant to real human experience, as Susan Nolen-Hoeksema did with her research. Our 
instructions to participants about what type of memory they should select were deliberately open-ended, leaving 
participants free to retrieve memories that were important to them in their day-to-day lives. The idiosyncratic nature 
of participants’ 180-character descriptions of their memories, and their reportedly ‘unresolved’ status, suggests that 
we succeeded in achieving high external validity with these topics. Participants also reported re-experiencing their 
memories vividly and becoming upset, which suggests that our mood induction procedure had internal validity as 
well. Our instructions did not specify which emotions we wished participants to experience, a design element with 
both pros and cons. Mood inductions have historically targeted a uniform emotional experience among all 
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participants (e.g., anger and hostility, Kross et al., 2005). But given that our independent variable was emotional 
clarity, and our hypothesis framed rumination as a search for answers, we needed to make sure we did not 
inadvertently tell participants the ‘answer’ about which emotion they were feeling. Leaving the target emotion 
unconstrained likely produced a wider range in emotional clarity among participants and ensured a more 
naturalistic degree of emotional clarity, since in everyday life people do not have psychologists naming emotions 
associated with particular experiences. A downside, however, is that participants’ emotions may have been 
relatively mixed or complex, and this complexity may have been confounded with emotional clarity ratings. Much 
more research is needed to help tease apart the relationship between the structure of mixed affective responses 
and the experience of emotional clarity, which is likely quite complicated (see Boden, Thompson, Dizén, 
Berenbaum, & Baker, 2013). A final strength related to our mood induction was that it allowed us to assess 
emotional clarity at the state level. Because affective experiences are ineffable and difficult to remember 
accurately, reporting on them as they unfold increases construct validity (Robinson & Clore, 2002). 
Clinical Implications and Future Directions 
Our findings indicate a number of possible avenues for treatment that may help prevent patients from falling into 
ruminative episodes. An obvious treatment target is emotional clarity itself: patients might benefit from increasing 
their ability to understand their emotions. Modern psychotherapies have already begun to incorporate training on 
identifying and labeling emotions with the assumption that these skills help patients better regulate their emotions 
(Barlow et al., 2010; Linehan, 1993; Mennin & Fresco, 2014). However, given that the main effect of emotional 
clarity was only marginal in our sample, perhaps low emotional clarity does not increase risk for rumination on its 
own. Rather, as our moderation result suggests, the problem may arise only when people are dissatisfied with a 
low level of clarity. Thus, our study points to a second potential treatment target: intolerance of ambiguity. In order 
to keep from ruminating, some patients might benefit from learning to tolerate or accept ambiguous emotional 
states without following the temptation to look for answers by ruminating. An existing treatment targeting 
intolerance of uncertainty (Dugas et al., 2003; Ladoucer et al., 2000) could serve as a guide. Our results begin to 
suggest that such techniques could be incorporated profitably into rumination-focused interventions (see Watkins et 
al., 2011) to help reduce the allure of ruminating. 
We consider it essential for future research to address some additional questions about the relationship between 
emotional clarity and rumination that could inform clinical interventions. First, to what extent might people use 
rumination to search for emotional clarity on purpose?  Participants in meta-cognitive studies consciously perceive 
benefits of ruminating (e.g., Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001; 2002), so perhaps some individuals deploy rumination as 
a strategy for responding to low emotional clarity deliberately. On the other hand, emotion regulation often 
proceeds unconsciously (Gyurak, Gross, & Etkin, 2011), and individuals with low emotional clarity may have 
particularly reduced awareness of their affective processes (Salovey et al., 1995). For interventions to interrupt the 
link between low emotional clarity and rumination, it may be necessary first to increase some patients’ awareness 
of when and why they ruminate. 
Secondly, if people turn to rumination in order to increase their emotional clarity, does it actually work? As we noted 
in our introduction, Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema (1993) found that participants who had been induced to 
ruminate versus distract themselves later rated themselves as more insightful on a trait measure of insight. But 
because that study did not assess self-reported insight before participants ruminated, it would be premature to 
conclude that ruminating increased their subjective sense of understanding the world. Moreover, there is a 
conceptual difference between believing oneself to be insightful as an individual versus feeling clear about 
emotions as they unfold, which makes it hard to translate Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema’s findings into 
predictions about emotional clarity. More work is needed to determine whether pursuing emotional clarity by 
ruminating is fruitless, or whether ruminating does in fact produce the answers ruminators seek, a reward that could 
reinforce rumination over time. 
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Conclusion 
In this investigation, we sought to expand upon the growing literature on rumination as a ‘search for answers’ (e.g., 
Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001, 2002; Watkins & Baracaia, 2001) by testing whether intolerance of ambiguity would 
moderate the association between low emotional clarity and rumination. In line with predictions, we found that 
among participants reporting high intolerance of ambiguity, low emotional clarity was associated with greater levels 
of rumination a few weeks later. This was not the case for participants who reported being able to tolerate 
ambiguity. In all, we found preliminary support consistent with a novel hypothesis that the desire to increase 
emotional clarity might lure some people into ruminating. We attempted to emulate Susan Nolen-Hoekesema’s 
person-inspired approach, and we underscore its value for discovering new factors associated with the initiation 
and maintenance of ruminative cycles. 
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